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While studies on visual memory commonly assume that the consolidation of a visual stimulus into
working memory is interrupted by a trailing mask, studies on dual-task interference suggest that the
consolidation of a stimulus can continue for several hundred milliseconds after a mask. As a result,
estimates of the time course of working memory consolidation differ more than an order of magnitude.
Here, we contrasted these opposing views by examining if and for how long the processing of a masked
display of visual stimuli can be disturbed by a trailing 2-alternative forced choice task (2-AFC; a color
discrimination task or a visual or auditory parity judgment task). The results showed that the presence of
the 2-AFC task produced a pronounced retroactive interference effect that dissipated across stimulus
onset asynchronies of 250–1,000 ms, indicating that the processing elicited by the 2-AFC task interfered
with the gradual consolidation of the earlier shown stimuli. Furthermore, this interference effect occurred
regardless of whether the to-be-remembered stimuli comprised a string of letters or an unfamiliar
complex visual shape, and it occurred regardless of whether these stimuli were masked. Conversely, the
interference effect was reduced when the memory load for the 1st task was reduced, or when the 2nd task
was a color detection task that did not require decision making. Taken together, these findings show that
the formation of a durable and consciously accessible working memory trace for a briefly shown visual
stimulus can be disturbed by a trailing 2-AFC task for up to several hundred milliseconds after the
stimulus has been masked. By implication, the current findings challenge the common view that working
memory consolidation involves an immutable central processing bottleneck, and they also make clear that
consolidation does not stop when a stimulus is masked.
Keywords: working-memory consolidation, backward masking, attentional blink, psychological refrac-
tory period, retroactive dual-task interference
In dealing with a rapid and ever-changing stream of visual
sensory input, the storage of information in working memory
forms a central requirement for many perceptual and cognitive
tasks. While considerable insight has been gained into the quality
and quantity of information that can be stored in working memory
(e.g., Prinzmetal, Amiri, Allen, & Edwards, 1998; Wilken & Ma,
2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008), the mechanisms that mediate the
initial transfer and consolidation of visual information into work-
ing memory remain poorly understood. As a case in point, consider
the basic but important questions of how long it might take to
consolidate a familiar visual stimulus such as a letter, and how this
process might be affected when the letter is masked—a common
procedure in studies on visual perception, attention, and memory.
According to one influential perspective, the appearance of a mask
would interrupt consolidation, and therefore the finding that people
can recall about four letters from a 100-ms masked display entails
that it takes only 100 ms to consolidate four letters in working
memory (Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Vogel, Woodman, &
Luck, 2006). In contrast, another widely influential perspective
proposes that the consolidation of a single letter can continue for
several hundred milliseconds even after a mask (e.g., Chun &
Potter, 1995; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998). Evidently, one of
these perspectives must be incorrect, and resolving this matter is of
broad theoretical importance because our understanding of many
phenomena in research on perception, attention, and working
memory relies on assumptions about the dynamics and limits of
working memory consolidation (WMC). In the current study, we
set out to meet this demand by examining the origins of the
opposing views and by conducting a series of experiments that
aimed to adjudicate between them.
In characterizing the role of WMC in human information pro-
cessing, most accounts agree in assuming a distinction between
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two stages of processing. During the first of these two stages,
visual stimuli such as letters, words, and even pictures of unfa-
miliar scenes are rapidly represented and categorized by means of
the activation of neurons along the ventral processing stream (e.g.,
Keysers, Xiao, Foldiak, & Perrett, 2001; Thorpe, Fizet, & Marlot,
1996; see also Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Potter, 1975).
While this first stage of visual representation and categorization
may take only 100 ms, the resulting information is highly volatile
as it is rapidly lost due to decay and interference from cotempo-
raneous stimuli, which act as a mask (e.g., Averbach & Coriel,
1961; Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; Enns & Di Lollo, 2000; Kah-
neman, 1968; Kovács, Vogels, & Orban, 1995; Potter, 1976; Rolls,
Tovée, & Panzeri, 1999). Hence, the ability to report or judge a
stimulus after it has been masked is generally thought to require
that the stimulus undergoes a second stage of processing wherein
it is consolidated in working memory. Once this consolidation
process has been completed, the stimulus is said to be “stored” in
working memory where it can persist in the face of newly pre-
sented stimuli for a period of several seconds (Baddeley, 2012; see
also Miller, Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Oberauer, 2009).
The opposing views on the time-course of WMC derive from
the fact that this matter has been addressed with different para-
digms and assumptions, in different lines of research. The first
perspective derives from studies on visual masking, which com-
monly assume that if a stimulus can still be recalled after it has
been masked, then the consolidation of that stimulus must have
been completed before the appearance of the mask (Gegenfurtner
& Sperling, 1993; Vogel et al., 2006; see also Bays, Gorgoraptis,
Wee, Marshall, & Husain, 2011; Bundesen, 1990; Fuller, Luck,
McMahon, & Gold, 2005; Saults & Cowan, 2007; Shibuya &
Bundesen, 1988; Sun, Zimmer, & Fu, 2011; Todd, Han, Harrison,
& Marois, 2011; Woodman & Vogel, 2005; Wutz & Melcher,
2013; Zhang & Luck, 2008). Thus, according to this view, the
finding that observers can recall about four letters from a masked,
100-ms display entails that it takes only 100 ms of processing time
to consolidate four letters in working memory (Gegenfurtner &
Sperling, 1993; Vogel et al., 2006). The rationale underlying this
interpretation is that the consolidation of the letters can only
continue for as long as the representations of these letters are
available in sensory memory. Since these representations would be
rapidly overwritten by a trailing mask (e.g., Breitmeyer & Ogmen,
2000; see also Kovács et al., 1995; Rolls et al., 1999), it follows
that the mask would interrupt the consolidation of the letters in
working memory. By implication, any letters that can be recalled
after a mask would be assumed to have been consolidated in
working memory prior to the appearance of the mask.
A markedly different perspective on the temporal dynamics and
vulnerability of WMC can be found in research on dual-task
interference effects such as the attentional blink (Raymond, Sha-
piro, & Arnell, 1992)—the phenomenon that observers frequently
fail to encode the second of two target stimuli in memory if it
appears within less than half a second from the first. Importantly,
this effect has been shown to occur regardless of whether the first
target is masked (e.g., Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, 2009)
but only if the first target can be recalled (Nieuwenstein, Van der
Burg, Theeuwes, Wyble, & Potter, 2009), and it has also been
found that the magnitude of the attentional blink is stronger when
the amount of to-be-consolidated information is increased for the
first target (Olson, Chun, & Anderson, 2001; Ouimet & Jolicœur,
2007; see also Tombu et al., 2011). Accordingly, theories of the
attentional blink generally assume that this effect reflects a con-
sequence of consolidating the first target in memory, thus suggest-
ing that the consolidation of a visual stimulus continues for several
hundred milliseconds even after it has been masked (Bowman &
Wyble, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998;
Shih, 2008; Taatgen, Juvina, Schippers, Borst, & Martens, 2009;
Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009; Wyble, Potter, Bowman,
& Nieuwenstein, 2011; see also Lagroix, Spalek, Wyble, Jannati,
& Di Lollo, 2012). In explaining how this might occur, theories of
the attentional blink generally converge in assuming that the effect
of a visual mask is confined to disrupting the processing of stimuli
prior to selection for consolidation, that is, during the first stage of
processing. Once selected for consolidation, however, the repre-
sentation of a stimulus is thought to undergo a strengthening (Shih,
2008) or binding process (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Wyble et al.,
2009, 2011) that allows this representation to be sustained even in
the face of a trailing mask, until consolidation is completed.
The Present Study
Evidently, the available perspectives on the time course of
consolidating information in working memory are extremely di-
vergent, and resolving this matter is of both practical and theoret-
ical importance. After all, if it were true that consolidation is
interrupted by a mask and that the consolidation of a single letter
takes only 25 ms, then this would entail that a variety of theories
of the attentional blink are incorrect in assuming that this effect
reflects the time course of WMC.1 Conversely, if it were true that
WMC can continue for several hundred milliseconds after a mask,
then this would entail that researchers can no longer assume that
backward masking can be used as a means to assess or restrict the
duration of consolidation, as has been done in many previous
empirical and theoretical studies (e.g., Bays et al., 2011; Bundesen,
1990; Fuller et al., 2005; Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Saults &
Cowan, 2007; Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988; Sun et al., 2011; Todd
et al., 2011; Vogel et al., 2006; Woodman & Vogel, 2005; Wutz &
Melcher, 2013; Zhang & Luck, 2008).2
The goal of the current study was to adjudicate between the
opposing perspectives on the dynamics of WMC. To this end, we
examined if and for how long the processing of a masked display
of to-be-remembered stimuli can be disrupted by a trailing
2-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task. The rationale underlying
this approach resembles that underlying the interruption-by-
masking approach (e.g., Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Vogel et
al., 2006) in that it aimed to characterize the time course of WMC
1 It is worth noting that the implications of such a rapid consolidation
process reach beyond theories of the attentional blink, as the assumption
that WMC involves a relatively slow process also features in other theories,
including the theory of short-term memory proposed by Jonides et al.
(2008) and Oberauer and colleagues’ theory of performance in the complex
span task (Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012).
2 It is worth mentioning that proponents on both sides of this debate have
argued against each other’s proposals, such that Vogel et al. (2006) argued that
“the attentional blink paradigm does not provide a good means of estimating
the time course of WM consolidation” (p. 1437), whereas researchers working
on the attentional blink have argued that “the manipulation of memory-mask
stimulus onset asynchrony” used by Vogel et al. does not affect “consolidation
duration” (p. 224; Shih, 2008) and therefore should not be taken as a proper





































































































1410 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
by means of examining for how long this process can be disturbed,
but it differed from the interruption-by-masking approach in that
we used a 2-AFC task instead of a task-irrelevant mask to disrupt
WMC. Our choice for using this type of task was based on the
assumption that the processing required for a 2-AFC task may
interfere with WMC because it relies on the same processing
mechanisms as those involved in WMC. To be precise, there are
several neuroimaging studies that show that WMC relies on a
network of frontal and parietal brain areas that are also activated in
tasks that require participants to decide upon and select an appro-
priate response for a stimulus (Marti, Sigman, & Dehaene, 2012;
Tombu et al., 2011; see also Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Zylberberg,
Slezak, Roelfsema, Dehaene, & Sigman, 2010). Furthermore, there
are several behavioral studies that suggest that these two types of
tasks produce interference when they need to be performed for two
targets shown in close temporal succession (e.g., Arnell & Duncan,
2002; Arnell, Helion, Hurdelbrink, & Pasieka, 2004; De Jong &
Sweet, 1994; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Koch & Ru-
miati, 2006; Ruthruff & Pashler, 2001; Stevanovski & Jolicœur,
2007, 2011; see also Wong, 2002). Accordingly, we reasoned that
if the consolidation of a visual stimulus continues after a mask,
then it might still suffer interference from a trailing 2-AFC task
because the execution of this task would call upon the same central
processing resources that mediate the ongoing consolidation of the
earlier shown stimuli.
While the aforementioned considerations suggest that it is plau-
sible that the consolidation of a visual stimulus can be disrupted by
means of a trailing 2-AFC task, it is important to note that this type
of retroactive interference effect has thus far not been observed in
studies that combined a memory encoding task with a trailing
2-AFC task (Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Arnell et al., 2004; Jolicœur
& Dell’Acqua, 1998; Koch & Rumiati, 2006; Ruthruff & Pashler,
2001; Stevanovski & Jolicœur, 2007, 2011; Tombu et al., 2011).
To be precise, these studies all found that performance on the
2-AFC task suffers a pronounced proactive interference effect in
the form of a psychological refractory period effect (i.e., a decrease
in response times with increasing stimulus onset asynchrony
[SOA]; Welford, 1952; see also Pashler, 1994), whereas perfor-
mance on the memory task showed little to no evidence for a
concomitant retroactive interference effect. Accordingly, accounts
of performance in these types of tasks generally agree in assuming
that WMC imposes an immutable, central information-processing
bottleneck, the idea being that response selection for the second
task is postponed until the consolidation of information for the first
task is completed (e.g., Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; Marois &
Ivanoff, 2005; Tombu et al., 2011; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Roelf-
sema, & Sigman, 2011). Importantly, however, closer scrutiny of
the methods and results of the experiments at stake shows that the
lack of retroactive interference may be more apparent than real. To
wit, most of these studies used a memory task for which perfor-
mance was close to ceiling, but the few studies that used a
relatively difficult memory task do seem to show some degree of
improvement in first-target performance across SOA (e.g., Exper-
iment 2 in Arnell & Duncan, 2002; the conditions with a memory
set of three symbols in Experiments 3 and 5 by Jolicœur &
Dell’Acqua, 1998; Experiment 3 in Stevanovski & Jolicœur,
2007). Indeed, the current study shows that the consolidation of a
masked visual stimulus can suffer pronounced retroactive interfer-
ence from a trailing 2-AFC task, but the magnitude of this effect
depends on the difficulty of both tasks.
Experiments 1 and 2: The Demonstration of
Retroactive Dual-Task Interference
To examine whether the consolidation of a visual stimulus can
be disrupted after a mask, by means of a trailing 2-AFC task, we
conducted two experiments that differed in terms of whether the
to-be-remembered stimuli comprised verbal or nonverbal visual
stimuli (see Figure 1). Specifically, in Experiment 1, participants
were asked to encode a string of four letters in memory for a
delayed free recall test, while in Experiment 2 participants were
asked to encode an unfamiliar, complex shape (i.e., a Kanji char-
acter) for a delayed recognition test. In both experiments, the
to-be-remembered stimulus was shown for about 100 ms and
followed by a mask in half the trials. The presence versus absence
of the mask was crossed with the presence versus absence of a
visual parity judgment task that required a speeded odd-even
judgment of a digit that could appear at an SOA of 250; 500; or
1,000 ms (Experiment 1), or 247; 494; 1,000; or 1,494 ms (Ex-
periment 2) from the earlier shown targets for the memory task.
In accordance with theories of the attentional blink (e.g., Wyble
et al., 2009, 2011), we hypothesized that the consolidation of both
the letters and the Kanji character would continue after the mask,
and we further hypothesized that this still ongoing consolidation
process would be disrupted by the trailing 2-AFC task. Based on
these hypotheses, we predicted that, regardless of the presence of
a mask, the 2-AFC task would lead to an impairment in memory
for the preceding stimuli, and we predicted that the magnitude of
this impairment would dissipate with increasing SOA, thus reflect-
ing the increasing likelihood that consolidation could be completed
prior to the disruptive second task. In contrast, if the consolidation
of the stimuli would already be completed—or terminated—upon
the appearance of a mask (e.g., Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993;
Vogel et al., 2006), then the presence of the second task could no
longer interfere with the consolidation of these stimuli though it
might still interfere with their retention in working memory (e.g.,
Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Barrouillet, Bernardin,
Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; Oberauer, Lewandowsky,
Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012; Ricker & Cowan, 2010). If so,
then one would not expect the interference effect to dissipate as a
function of SOA as previous studies examining dual-task interfer-
ence during the retention interval of a working memory task have
found that such interference effects tend to increase—not de-
crease—as a function of SOA (Ricker & Cowan, 2010).
Method
Participants. Experiment 1 was conducted at the University
of Groningen and Experiment 2 was conducted at Penn State
University. For both experiments, the participants were 16 under-
graduate psychology students who volunteered to participate in
return for course credit.
Materials. In both experiments, the presentation of stimuli
and the registration of responses was controlled using Eprime 1.2.
In Experiment 1, the stimuli were displayed on a monitor set to
1,024  768 pixels, with a refresh rate of 100 Hz. In Experiment
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Figure 1. Design and results of Experiments 1 and 2. The upper panel shows the design of the two experiments,
and the lower panels show the results. From top to bottom, the panels show the average performance in the
memory task, the dual-task cost defined as the difference in performance between the single and the dual task
condition, and the average response times (RT) for the parity judgment task. Error bars show the SE of the mean.





































































































1412 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
The memory task in Experiment 1 required recall of a string of
four letters that were selected randomly without replacement from
the alphabet (excluding M, W, and all vowels). The mask consisted
of a string four “#” symbols and the digit used for the parity
judgment task was randomly selected from the set {2–9}. Letters
and digits were drawn in a black, 20-point Helvetica font and
shown on a white background. The mask was drawn in a boldfaced
24-point Helvetica font. The reason for using a boldfaced and
larger font for the mask was to ensure that the line elements
comprising the mask overlapped with most of the line elements of
the letters.
In Experiment 2, participants had to memorize a Kanji charac-
ter3 that matched the identity of a randomly selected letter of the
Roman alphabet. The mask for the Kanji character consisted of
three other Kanji characters that were displayed on top of each
other to create a dense mask that included most of the line
elements also present in the to-be-remembered Kanji (see Figure
1). To test participants’ memory for the Kanji character, we used
a four-alternative forced-choice recognition test in which the to-
remembered Kanji character had to be selected from a set of four
Kanji characters. The foils in this recognition test were selected at
random from the set of Kanji characters, excluding the characters
that were used for the mask. The Kanji target, mask, and digit were
all drawn in a 48-point font.
Design and procedure. Both experiments used a within-
subject design with three factors, namely the presence of a mask,
the presence of a parity judgment task, and the SOA separating the
to-be-remembered stimuli from the parity judgment task. In Ex-
periment 1, the SOA separating the letter string from the target for
the parity judgment task was 250; 500; or 1,000 ms. In Experiment
2, the SOA was 247; 494; 1,000; or 1,494 ms. In both experiments,
the different trial types were randomly intermixed. Experiment 1
included a total of 240 trials (20 replications per condition), while
Experiment 2 included a total of 384 trials (24 replications per
condition).
Due to the use of monitors with different refresh rates, there
were some minor differences in the timing of the stimuli between
the two experiments. We here describe the main features of the
trial procedure, and we refer to Figure 1 for information about the
exact timing of the stimuli. In both experiments, a trial began with
a fixation cross in the center of the screen. The participants could
then initiate the trial by pressing the spacebar using their left hand.
The fixation display then remained in view for 400 ms before the
to-be-remembered stimulus was shown (100 ms). This stimulus
was followed either by a mask or by a blank interval that matched
the duration of the mask (100 ms). Subsequently, there was a
blank interval of varying duration to create SOAs of varying
duration. In the dual-task condition, this blank interval was fol-
lowed by the presentation of a digit (100 ms) for which partic-
ipants had to indicate as quickly as possible whether it was odd or
even, by pressing one of two designated keys using the index and
middle fingers of their right hand. The memory test (a probe to
report the four letters, or the recognition test for the Kanji char-
acter) followed immediately after this response was recorded. In
the single-task condition, the digit was replaced by a blank inter-
val, and there was a 1-s retention interval before the memory test
was presented. By including this 1-s retention interval, we aimed
to equate the retention intervals in the dual and single-task condi-
tions.
Data-analysis. Trials on which response times (RT) for the
parity judgment were shorter than 200 ms or longer than the
participant’s mean response time plus 2.5 SD were excluded as
outliers. The analyses of accuracy in the memory task and RTs in
the parity judgment task only included trials on which the parity
judgment was correct.
Results
Experiment 1: The memory task. The total number of cor-
rectly recalled letters was examined with a repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included SOA, the presence of
a pattern mask, and the presence of the parity judgment task as
factors. The analysis revealed significant main effects of all three
factors (all ps  .001, all hp2s  .65) and a significant interaction
of SOA and the presence of a second task, F(2, 30)  15.2, p 
.001, hp2  .50. As can be seen in Figure 1, this dual-task cost
dissipated as SOA increased from 250–1,000 ms, and its magni-
tude was not affected by whether the letters were masked. Com-
parisons of performance at each SOA showed that the detrimental
effect of the second task was significant at all SOAs, regardess of
the presence of a mask (all ps  .007).
Experiment 1: The parity judgment task. The analysis of
response accuracy for the parity judgment task showed no signif-
icant effects of the presence of a pattern mask, or of SOA (all ps
.14), with the average performance being 87.8% correct. A similar
analysis of the response times revealed a significant effect of SOA,
F(2, 30)  8.7, p  .001, hp2  .37, with response times being
slightly faster at the 500-ms SOA than at the the 250- and
1,000-ms SOAs (both ps  .037; see Figure 1).
Aside from examining the effects of SOA on response times, we
also examined if these response times depended on the number of
letters that could be recalled for the memory task. To this end, we
used the data from trials with a 250-ms SOA, and we compared the
average response times for the parity judgment task for trials on
which 0–2 or 3–4 letters could be correctly recalled. The results4
showed that responses for the parity judgment task were not
affected by the number of letters that could be recalled for the
memory task, with the mean response times being 588 and 581 ms,
respectively, for trials in which 0–2 or 3–4 letters could be
recalled (F  1).
Experiment 2: The memory task. As can be seen in Figure
1, the results for Experiment 2 closely resembled those of Exper-
iment 1. Performance on the recognition test showed significant
main effects of the presence of a mask, the presence of the parity
judgment task, and SOA (all Fs  14.24, all ps  .001, all hp2s 
.49). The only other effect to reach significance was the interaction
between SOA and the presence of the parity judgment task, F(3,
45)  16.36, p  .001, hp2  .52 (all other ps  .26). Pair-wise
comparisons of performance at each SOA showed that the parity
judgment produced a significant interference effect at SOAs of 250
3 Font set retrieved from http://web.archive.org/web/19990429083728/
http://www.west.net/~kurrasch/kanji.htm
4 This analysis was based on the data for 15 participants, as one
participant always recalled three to four letters. These 15 participants
each had at least one observation in each cell of the design, and the
results did not change when we only considered the data for 12
participants who had at least five observations in each cell (RT0-2  598






































































































and 500 ms, regardless of whether the Kanji character was masked
(all ps  .009). At SOAs of 1,000 and 1,500 ms, there was still a
suggestion of some interference, but this effect only reached sig-
nificance for the 1,494-ms SOA in the masked condition (p 
.048). The other comparisons showed a trend in the same direction
(all ps  .056).
Experiment 2: The parity judgment task. Accuracy in the
parity judgment task showed a significant effect of SOA, F(3,
45)  5.85, p  .002, hp2  .28, with responses being accurate on
93.8, 90.6, 92.8, and 95.4% of the trials for SOAs of 247; 494;
1,000; and 1,494 ms, respectively. Accuracy was not influenced by
the presence of a mask (all ps  .10). For the analysis of response
times, the only effect to reach significance was the main effect of
SOA, F(2.1, 31.0)  4.04, p  .026, hp2  .21 (all other ps  .12).
Post-hoc comparisons showed that the average response time was
significantly slower at the 250-ms SOA than at the 1,000-ms SOA
(p  .006). None of the other comparisons between SOAs reached
significance (all ps  .072). As in Experiment 1, we again exam-
ined if the response times for the 250-ms SOA condition depended
on accuracy for the memory task and found that there was no such
relationship. Indeed, if anything the response times were slightly
faster on trials in which the response for the recognition test was
correct (M  597 ms) than on trials in which this response was
incorrect (M  629 ms), F(1, 15)  3.31, p  .089, hp2  .18.
Discussion
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that memory for two
different types of visual stimuli (i.e., a string of letters or a
complex, unfamiliar shape) is significantly impaired if the stimuli
are followed closely in time by the target for a visual speeded
parity judgment task. To be precise, the presence of this parity
judgment task produced a pronounced retroactive interference
effect that decreased across SOAs of 250–1,000 ms and then
appeared to remain stable across SOAs of 1,000–1,494 ms, sug-
gesting that the processing elicited by this second task interfered
with the gradual consolidation of the earlier shown stimuli. Im-
portantly, the magnitude of and time course of this effect were not
affected by whether the to-be-remembered stimuli were masked,
even though the presence of a mask did have a pronounced
detrimental effect on the memory task.5 Suffice it to say, the
results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that memory for a string of
letters or an unfamiliar complex shape derives from a time-
consuming consolidation process that continues for several hun-
dred milliseconds after a mask and that can be disrupted by a
trailing speeded visual parity judgment task.
Experiments 3–5: Boundary Conditions of the
Retroactive Interference Effect
In demonstrating a strong and highly significant retroactive
interference effect for two different types of memory tasks, the
results of Experiments 1 and 2 differ markedly from those obtained
in related previous studies. To wit, the results of these previous
studies typically show that performance for the first of two suc-
cessive targets is accurate, whereas performance for the second
target suffers a pronounced attentional blink or psychological
refractory period effect, meaning that the second target tends to be
missed (i.e., an attentional blink effect), or responded to slowly
(i.e., a psychological refractory period effect), when it appears
shortly after the first target (e.g., Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Arnell et
al., 2004; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Koch & Rumiati,
2006; Ruthruff & Pashler, 2001; Stevanovski & Jolicœur, 2007,
2011; Tombu et al., 2011). In contrast, the results of Experiments
1 and 2 showed only a minor psychological refractory period
effect, but they did show a pronounced retroactive interference
effect. To address the reasons for this discrepancy, Experiments
3–5 aimed to examine the boundary conditions for the retroactive
interference effect found in Experiments 1 and 2.
As a first step toward examining these boundary conditions,
Experiment 3 used the same memory task as Experiment 1 and
examined if the retroactive interference effect would also occur
with a different type of 2-AFC task (i.e., a color discrimination
task). In addition, this experiment examined whether the interfer-
ence would be attenuated if this task were to be changed to a
speeded color detection task, the idea being that such a detection
task would not pose as strong a demand on decision making and
response selection processes and thus produce less interference. In
Experiment 4, we again replicated Experiment 1 and this time
examined if the retroactive interference effect would be attenuated
if the encoding load for the first task is reduced from four to two
letters, the idea being that the interference effect should be more
pronounced when the processing demands for WMC are higher.
Last, Experiment 5 replicated Experiment 2 and examined if the
retroactive interference effect would also occur when the target for
the second task—a speeded parity judgment task—would be pre-
sented in the auditory modality, the idea being that if the interfer-
ence derives from the engagement of amodal, central processing
mechanisms involved in decision making and response selection
processes, then it should occur regardless of the input modality of
the second target (e.g., Pashler, 1998).
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we examined if the retroactive interference
effect we found in Experiment 1 would be replicated in case the
second task involved a color discrimination task that required
participants to make a speeded 2-AFC for a red or green colored
square. The second goal of Experiment 3 was to determine if any
retroactive interference produced by this color discrimination task
would be reduced if this task would be changed into a less
demanding color detection task wherein participants had to re-
spond as quickly as possible to any colored square, using the same
response key. Assuming that the retroactive interference effect
stems from the decision making and response selection require-
ments for a 2-AFC task, we predicted that the effect observed in
5 Indeed, if anything, it appears as though the presence of the mask may
have rendered the consolidation of the earlier shown stimuli more suscep-
tible to the interference from the trailing 2-AFC task. Specifically, the
analyses reported above examined overall recall or recognition accuracy
and showed that the detrimental effect of the mask was constant across
SOA and the presence of the second task. By implication, if one were to
normalize the data according to the level of performance achieved in the
single-task condition, the magnitude of interference produced by the parity
judgment task would be greater for the condition in which the memory





































































































1414 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
Experiment 1 would be replicated with a color discrimination task
and that it would be attenuated in case of a color detection task.
Method.
Participants. A sample of 34 undergraduate students from the
University of Groningen participated in Experiment 3 in return for
course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to the
color-detection or color-discrimination task, which each included
17 participants. None of the participants reported any difficulty in
distinguishing red and green.
Materials, design, procedure, and data-analysis. The materi-
als, design, procedure and data-preprocessing steps taken in Ex-
periment 3 were identical to those of Experiment 1, with three
changes. The first and primary change was that the digit that was
used as a second target in Experiment 1 was replaced by a red or
a green square of 32  32 pixels. The second change was that
Experiment 3 only included two SOAs, namely, 300 and 1,000 ms.
The third change was that the letters were always followed by a
mask. Thus, the design of Experiment 3 comprised a 2  2  2
design, with two within-subject factors (SOA and presence vs.
absence of a second task), and one between-subjects factor (color
discrimination vs. color detection task). Participants were told that
they would see a brief and masked display of four letters that had
to be identified and that could be followed by a red or a green
square. Participants in the color-detection condition were told to
respond as quickly as possible to any colored square by pressing
the “0” key of the number pad of the keyboard. For participants in
the color-discrimination condition, the instructions for the colored
square were to press the “1” key as quickly as possible in case it
was red, or the “2” key in case it was green. The experiments with
a color discrimination and detection task each comprised a total of
144 trials, which were preceded by 16 practice trials.
Results.
The memory task. Performance for the memory task is shown
in Figures 2a and 2b. The total number of letters recalled was
examined using a repeated measures analysis of variance that
included SOA (300 vs. 1,000 ms) and the presence of a second task
(single vs. dual task) as within-subject factors, and the nature of
the second task (color detection vs. discrimination) as a between-
subjects factor. The results of this analysis showed that the main
effects of SOA and the presence of a second task were both
significant, F(1, 32)  23.50, p  .001, hp2  .42, and, F(1, 32) 
33.11, p  .001, hp2  .51, respectively. There was no significant
main effect of the nature of the second task, F(1, 32)  0.47, p 
.5, indicating that overall, there was no difference in recall accu-
racy between participants who performed the color detection and
discrimination tasks. The results also showed a highly significant
interaction of SOA and the presence of a second task, F(1, 32) 
20.97, p  .001, hp2  .40, indicating that the detrimental effect of
both types of second tasks was stronger at the short than at the long
SOA, and all other two-way interactions were close to significance
(all Fs  3.95, all ps  .056, and all hp2s  .11). Most important,
the three-way interaction closely approximated statistical signifi-
cance, F(1, 32)  4.00, p  .054, hp2  .11, reflecting that the
retroactive interference effect was stronger in the color discrimi-
nation than in the color detection condition (see Figures 2A and
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A. Color Discrimination B. Color Detection C. Response Times
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 3. A. Performance in the memory task for participants in the color
discrimination condition. The color discrimination task was present in the dual-task condition and absent in the
single task condition. B. Performance in the memory task for participants in the color detection condition. The
color detection task was present in the dual-task condition and absent in the single task condition. C. Response






































































































mance in the dual-task condition showed a significant interaction
of SOA and the nature of the second task, F(1, 32)  5.21, p 
.029, hp2  .14, indicating that the effect of SOA was more
pronounced in the condition with a color discrimination task than
in the condition with a color detection task. Furthermore, a com-
parison of the dual-task interference effect at the 300-ms SOA
showed that this interference effect was significantly stronger
when the second task was a color discrimination task, t(32) 2.25,
p  .032.
The color detection and discrimination tasks. Responses for
the color detection task were accurate on 100% of the trials,
indicating that the colored square was impossible to miss due to
the fact that the program would wait until a response to the square
was registered. For the color discrimination task, responses were
accurate on 89.8% of the trials, and response accuracy did not
depend on SOA (F  1). Response times on the detection and
discrimination tasks were examined for effects of SOA and task.
The results showed a significant main effect of task, F(1, 32) 
15.34, p  .001, hp2  .32, with the mean response times being
348.5 and 508.4 ms, respectively, for the color detection and
discrimination tasks. In addition, there was a significant interaction
of SOA and the nature of the task, F(1, 32) 5.09, p .031, hp2
.14 (see Figure 2C). This interaction was further explored by
examining the effect of SOA for each task condition separately.
These analyses showed that while there was a significant increase
in response times across SOA in the color detection task, F(1,
16)  4.95, p  .041, hp2  .24, there was no effect of SOA on
response times in the color discrimination task (F  1). Last, we
examined if response times for the color discrimination task in the
condition with a 300-ms SOA depended on the number of letters
that could be recalled for the memory task. The results of this
analysis corroborated those of the same analyses done for Exper-
iments 1 and 2, as response times were again found to be inde-
pendent of whether 0–2 or 3–4 letters could be recalled (M  532
vs. M  555 ms, respectively; F  1).
Discussion. The results of Experiment 3 present two main
findings of interest. To start, they show that the retroactive inter-
ference effect observed in Experiment 1 could be replicated with a
different type of 2-AFC task than a speeded visual parity judgment
task, namely, a speeded color discrimination task. Second, they
show that the retroactive interference effect was significantly at-
tenuated when the color discrimination task was changed to an
easier color detection task that did not require response selection,
whereas it did require the speeded execution of a response. Taken
together, these findings attest to the generality of the retroactive
interference effect observed in Experiments 1 and 2, and they
make clear that the magnitude of this effect depends on the
processing load and difficulty of the second task.
Experiment 4
While the results of Experiment 3 show that the processing load
associated with the second task is an important determinant of the
retroactive interference effect, Experiment 4 aimed to determine if
the magnitude of this effect also depends on the amount of infor-
mation that needs to be consolidated in working memory for the
first task. To this end, we replicated the masked condition of
Experiment 1 and varied the number of letters that had to be
consolidated in memory for the memory task. Specifically, in half
the trials, the memory display included two letters that were shown
simultaneously for 50 ms, and followed by a 100-ms mask. In the
other trials, the memory display included four letters that were
shown for 100 ms and followed by a 100-ms mask. The reason for
using a shorter exposure duration for the two-letter displays was
that we anticipated that performance would be close to ceiling in
case the two letters would be shown for 100 ms. As in Experiments
1 and 2, the second task was a speeded visual parity judgment task,
and this task was present in half the trials.
Method.
Participants. A sample of 18 undergraduate students from the
University of Groningen participated in Experiment 4 in return for
course credit.
Materials, design, procedure, and data-analysis. The materi-
als, design, procedure and data-preprocessing steps in Experiment
4 were similar to those of Experiment 1. The differences were that
in Experiment 4, the memory display could comprise two or four
letters that were followed by a mask comprising two or four
hashtags and that the presentation duration of the memory display
was set to 50 ms for the two-letters condition. Trials with two and
four letters were randomly intermixed. Thus, the design of Exper-
iment 4 comprised a 3 (SOA: 250, 500, or 1,000 ms)  2
(consolidation load: two or four letters)  2 (second task—a
speeded visual parity judgment task—present vs. absent). The
experiment consisted of a total of 240 trials, and it was preceded
by 16 practice trials.
Results.
The memory task. The number of correctly recalled letters for
the memory tasks with two and four letters are shown in Figure 3a.
To examine these results, we first performed two separate repeated
measures analyses of variance for the conditions with two and four
letters. These two analyses yielded the same pattern of results,
such that all main effects and the interaction of SOA and the
presence of a second task were significant regardless of whether
the memory set comprised two and four letters (all Fs  3.49, all
ps  .042, and all hp2s  .17). To compare the retroactive inter-
ference effects for the conditions with two and four letters, we
computed the difference between the single and the dual-task
conditions (data shown in Figure 3b) and then subjected the
resulting difference scores to a 3  2 repeated-measures ANOVA
that included SOA (250; 500; or 1,000 ms) and consolidation load
(two vs. four letters) as factors. The results of this analysis showed
that the main effects of SOA and consolidation load were signif-
icant, with Fs  13.98, ps  .001, and hp2s  .45. In addition, the
interaction of SOA and consolidation load was significant, F(2,
34)  3.67, p  .036, hp2  .18. The results of pair-wise compar-
isons between the conditions with two and four letters showed that
the dual-task interference effect was significantly stronger with a
memory set of four letters than with a memory set of two letters,
and this was true at the SOAs of 250 and 500 ms (both ts  4.57,
both ps  .001) but not at the 1,000-ms SOA, t(17)  1.64, p 
.12.
The parity judgment task. Responses for the parity judgment
task were accurate on 92.3%, of the trials, and response accuracy
did not show significant effects of SOA or consolidation load (all
Fs  1.45). The analysis of response times also showed no
significant effects of these factors (all Fs  2.0, all ps  .14; see
Figure 3C). As in the previous experiments, we also examined if





































































































1416 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
focusing on trials with a consolidation load of four letters, and an
SOA of 250 ms. The results of this analysis showed that response
times for this condition did not differ significantly between trials in
which 0–2 or 3–4 letters were correctly recalled (M  671 vs.
M  651 ms, respectively; F  1).
Discussion. The results of Experiment 4 show that the retroac-
tive interference effect was attenuated when the consolidation load for
the memory task was reduced from four to two letters. This finding is
of importance because it suggests that the extent to which consolida-
tion is vulnerable to interference from a trailing 2-AFC task depends
on the amount of information that needs to be consolidated into
working memory. Taken together with the results of Experiment 3,
this finding shows that the occurrence and magnitude of the retroac-
tive interference effect depend on both the difficulty of the second
task and the consolidation load associated with the first task.
Experiment 5
In the previous experiments, the consolidation of verbal or
nonverbal stimuli was found to be disrupted by trailing 2-AFC task
requiring the speeded discrimination of a visual target (i.e., a digit
or a colored square). If the cause of this interference effect lies in
the amodal, central processing requirements for the 2-AFC task, it
follows that a similar effect should be found if the target for this
task would be presented in the auditory modality. The goal of
Experiment 5 was to test this prediction. To this end, we conducted
a second version of Experiment 2 to examine if the consolidation
of a masked Kanji character would also be disrupted by a trailing
speeded auditory parity judgment task.
Method.
Participants. A sample of 19 undergraduate students from the
University of Groningen participated in Experiment 5 in return for
course credit. All participants were native Dutch speakers.
Materials, design, procedure, and data-analysis. Experiment
5 was a replication of Experiment 2, with the following differ-
ences. To start, Experiment 5 was conducted at the University of
Groningen, using a monitor set to 1,024 768 pixels and a refresh
rate of 100 Hz. The primary difference with Experiment 2 was that
in Experiment 5 the target for the second task was an auditory digit
drawn from the set {1–6}. This digit was recorded in Dutch and
compressed to a 93-ms presentation duration (see also Van der
Burg, Brederoo, Nieuwenstein, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2010), and it
was presented over headphones, at a volume comfortable to the
participant.
The design of Experiment 5 comprised a 2  2 within-subject
design, including as factors the presence versus absence of the
auditory parity judgment task, and the SOA separating the Kanji
character and the presentation of the auditory target (300 or
1,000 ms). The Kanji character was shown for 100 ms, and
followed by a 100-ms mask that comprised three overlapping
Kanji characters. The other characteristics of the procedure
were identical to the procedure used in Experiment 2. The
experiment comprised a total of 96 trials, yielding 24 replica-
tions per SOA for the single and the dual-task conditions, and
it started with 16 practice trials.
Results.
The memory task. Figure 4a shows recognition accuracy for
the Kanji character for the single and dual-task conditions, with
accuracy plotted as a function of SOA. A repeated measures
analysis of variance showed that the main effect of SOA failed
to reach significance, F(1, 18)  2.42, p  .14, whereas the
main effect of the presence vs. absence of the second task did
reach significance, F(1, 18)  5.04, p  .038, hp2  .22. Most
important, the results showed a significant interaction of SOA
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 4. A. Performance in the memory task. B. Dual-task interference effect,
defined in terms of the number of letters lost due to the presence of the parity judgment task. C. Response times






































































































hp2  .20. Recognition accuracy was significantly worse in the
dual than in the single task condition at the 300-ms SOA,
t(18)  2.68, p  .015, but not at the 1,000-ms SOA, t(18) 
0.46.
The parity judgment task. Responses for the parity judg-
ment task were accurate on 91.3%, of the trials, and response
accuracy did not show a significant effect of SOA (F  1). The
analysis of response times did show a significant effect of SOA,
F(1, 18)  7.95, p  .011, hp2  .31 (see Figure 4b), with
responses being slower at the 300 than at the 1,000-ms SOA
(M  591.15 vs. M  526.77 ms, respectively). However,
response times for the 300-ms SOA condition did not depend on
whether the Kanji character could be correctly recalled, with the
average response times being 580 and 590 ms, respectively, for
trials in which the response for the recognition test was correct
or incorrect (F  1).
Discussion. The results of Experiment 5 extend those of the
previous experiments in showing that the processing of a first
to-be-remembered stimulus (a masked Kanji character) can also
be disrupted by means of a trailing auditory 2-AFC task. This
finding shows that the retroactive interference effect seen in the
previous studies did not stem from modality-specific interfer-
ence between the processing of the visual to-be-remembered
stimuli and the visual target for the trailing 2-AFC task. Rather,
the results of Experiment 5 can be said to corroborate those of
Experiment 3 in demonstrating that the retroactive interference
effect appears to occur due to the engagement of amodal,
central processing mechanisms for decision making and re-
sponse selection in an 2-AFC task.
General Discussion
While studies on visual memory commonly assume that the
consolidation of a stimulus into working memory stops when that
stimulus is replaced by a backward mask, studies on dual-task
interference suggest that consolidation can continue for hundreds
of milliseconds after a mask. As a result of these opposing views,
estimates of the time course of working memory consolidation
(WMC) differ by more than an order of magnitude, hindering our
understanding of phenomena wherein the dynamics and limits of
WMC play a central role. To resolve this state of affairs, the
current study aimed to adjudicate between the opposing views by
examining if and for how long the processing of a to-be-
remembered visual stimulus can still be disrupted after it has been
masked, by a trailing 2-AFC task. The rationale guiding this
approach was that if the consolidation of the stimulus is completed
only sometime after the mask, then the requirement to decide and
respond rapidly for the trailing 2-AFC task might cause interfer-
ence with this still ongoing consolidation process. Consistent with
this hypothesis, the results of five experiments showed that the
ability to recognize or recall a visual stimulus (an unfamiliar,
complex visual shape or a string of letters) is significantly im-
paired when this stimulus is followed within less than 1 s by the
target for a speeded 2-AFC task (a visual or auditory parity
judgment task, or a color discrimination task). To be precise, the
current experiments showed that performance on the memory task
improved as the SOA separating the to-be-remembered stimuli and
the trailing 2-AFC task increased from 250–1,000 ms, suggesting
that it took about 1 s of processing time before the stimuli had been
consolidated into a durable working memory representation that
Load 2, Single Task





























A. Recall Performance B. Response Times
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 5. A. Recognition accuracy for the memory task. B. Response times (RTs) for





































































































1418 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
could outlive the execution of the 2-AFC task.6 Furthermore, this
effect was found regardless of whether the stimulus had first been
followed by a mask, though the presence of the mask did lead to
lower performance on the memory task. Taken together, these
findings suggest that although the appearance of the mask did
restrict the amount of information that could be selected for
consolidation in working memory, it did not interrupt the consol-
idation process itself, as this process could still be disrupted for up
to several hundred milliseconds after a mask, by a trailing 2-AFC
task.
Aside from demonstrating that a speeded 2-AFC task can dis-
turb the formation of a durable (visual) working memory repre-
sentation for up to several hundred milliseconds after a stimulus
has been masked, the current experiments also identified two
boundary conditions for this retroactive dual-task interference ef-
fect. Specifically, Experiment 4 showed that the magnitude of the
retroactive interference effect was markedly attenuated when the
consolidation load for the memory task was decreased from four to
two letters, suggesting that the extent to which WMC is vulnerable
to interference depends on the amount of information that is being
consolidated. Second, the results of Experiment 3 showed that the
retroactive interference effect was markedly attenuated when the
second task was changed from a color discrimination task to a
color detection task, thus suggesting that the cause of the retroac-
tive interference stems from the requirement to make a rapid
choice. Indeed, the results of Experiment 5 showed that the con-
solidation of a masked visual stimulus was also significantly
disrupted by a trailing auditory 2-AFC task, thus providing addi-
tional evidence that the interference indeed derived from the
engagement of amodal processing mechanisms required for deci-
sion making and response selection in the 2-AFC task.
While the current experiments consistently showed that a
speeded 2-AFC task can interfere with memory for an earlier
presented stimulus, they also showed remarkably little evidence
for a concomitant proactive interference effect for the 2-AFC task.
To be precise, the response times for the 2-AFC task were only
slightly elevated at the shortest SOAs in Experiments 1, 2, and 5,
and there was no significant effect of SOA on response times in
Experiments 3 and 4. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 4
showed that response times were not significantly affected by
whether the memory task required recall of two or four letters,
indicating that the response time for the 2-AFC task was relatively
independent of the processing load associated with the memory
task. Indeed, the results of all five experiments showed that re-
sponse times at the shortest SOAs were independent of perfor-
mance on the memory task. Accordingly, it may be concluded that
the processing required for the 2-AFC task was little affected by
the consolidation of information for the memory task, as the
2-AFC task appeared to be executed without much delay even
though the consolidation of the earlier shown stimuli was clearly
not yet completed.
Relationship With Previous Findings
In demonstrating that the formation of a durable memory trace
can be disturbed for up to 1 s after the appearance of a to-be-
remembered stimulus, with little evidence for a concomitant pro-
active interference effect on the 2-AFC task that caused this
disturbance, the current findings present a remarkably different
pattern of results than that commonly seen in closely related
previous work. To be precise, there have been several previous
studies that combined a memory task with an ensuing speeded
2-AFC task, and the results of these studies typically show a
pronounced psychological refractory period effect for the 2-AFC
task and little to no retroactive interference for the memory task
(Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Arnell et al., 2004; Jolicœur &
Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Koch & Rumiati, 2006; Ruthruff &
Pashler, 2001; Stevanovski & Jolicœur, 2007, 2011; Tombu et al.,
2011). Likewise, research on the attentional blink has yielded
hundreds of studies that show a severe attentional blink deficit for
recall of the second target, whereas recall of the first target is
typically highly accurate (Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble,
2010), although in some conditions, recall of the first target does
show a slight impairment when the second target follows within
100 ms or less (e.g., Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Chun & Potter,
1995; see also Bachmann & Hommuk, 2005; Potter, Staub, &
O’Connor, 2002). Last, the current findings can also be contrasted
to those obtained in studies that examined whether the retention of
information in working memory can be interfered with by means
of a distractor stimulus or a second task, as the pattern of results
obtained in these studies also differs in interesting regards from
that observed in the current experiments. In the following sections,
we elaborate on these matters as we review and compare the
methods and findings of these three sets of previous studies to
those of the current experiments.
Studies combining a memory task with a trailing 2-AFC
task. As alluded to above, a remarkable aspect of the current
findings is that the pattern of interference effects seen for the first
and second task was opposite to the pattern commonly found in
studies that combined a memory task with a trailing speeded
2-AFC task. To wit, the archetypal pattern of results in these
previous studies is that response times for the 2-AFC task show a
pronounced and protracted psychological refractory period effect
(hereafter abbreviated as “PRP effect”), whereas performance on
the memory task shows little to no evidence for retroactive inter-
ference (see Figure 5A; Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Arnell et al.,
2004; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Koch & Rumiati, 2006;
Ruthruff & Pashler, 2001; Stevanovski & Jolicœur, 2007, 2011;
Tombu et al., 2011). In contrast, the current experiments showed a
pronounced and protracted retroactive interference effect, and they
showed only a minor PRP effect for the 2-AFC task.
In accounting for this discrepancy, an important first consider-
ation is that the above-described previous studies were focused
primarily on characterizing the PRP effect for the second target.
This is reflected in several aspects of the methods and analyses
reported in these studies. For instance, some of these studies did
not report an analysis of the effect of SOA on the memory task,
and the studies that did examine this effect did not restrict the data
to trials in which the response for the second task was correct,
6 In an unpublished experiment similar to Experiment 1, we also in-
cluded an SOA of 750 ms. The results replicated those of Experiment 1,
and they showed that the interference effect produced by the 2-AFC task
was significant at an SOA of 750 ms. Furthermore, this experiment also
showed that performance in the dual-task condition improved significantly
from an SOA of 750 ms to an SOA of 1,000 ms, indicating that it indeed







































































































which is desirable if one wants to assess if the processing of the
second target—as evidenced by a correct response—interfered
with the processing for the memory task. Likewise, the majority of
these studies did not include a single-task control condition in
which the memory task was performed without a trailing task, and
the studies that did incorporate such a control condition used a
blocked design, and this entails that any difference in performance
could also reflect a strategic difference in resource allocation
between the single and the dual-task conditions. Most important,
however, many of the experiments in question used a memory task
for which performance was very close to ceiling (i.e., above 93%
correct; see, e.g., Figure 5A), and this could, in principle, obscure
a retroactive interference effect. Indeed, the few experiments that
did show a hint of retroactive interference all employed a memory
task for which performance remained well below ceiling (Exper-
iment 2 in Arnell & Duncan, 2002; Experiments 3 and 5 in
Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua, 1998; Experiment 3 in Stevanovski &
Jolicœur, 2007), highlighting the plausibility of the ceiling effect
account. Indeed, it is also important to bear in mind that although
the current experiments showed that the retroactive interference
effect can be found across different combinations of memory and
2-AFC tasks, the magnitude of this effect was also found to depend
on the consolidation load for the first task, and the decision-
making requirements for the second task. Accordingly, it may be
concluded that while the retroactive interference effect is a robust
and replicable effect,7 the manifestation of this effect does require
a sufficiently demanding first and second task.
While the use of an easy memory task may thus account for the
lack of retroactive interference in previous studies, it is not imme-
diately clear why the use of an easy memory task would also give
rise to a stronger PRP effect than a more difficult memory task,
such as that used in the current study. Indeed, the magnitude of the
PRP effect is typically found to be stronger—not weaker—when
the consolidation load for a memory task is increased by increasing
the number of to-be-remembered letters (e.g., Jolicœur &
Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Tombu et al., 2011), a finding that was
not replicated in Experiment 4 of the current study. Interestingly,
however, the effect of consolidation load on the PRP effect appears
to depend on whether participants can use verbal coding in mem-
orizing the to-be-remembered items (Stevanovski & Jolicœur,
2007). Specifically, Stevanovski and Jolicœur (2007) showed that
the effect of consolidation load that was found by Tombu et al.
(2011) and Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1998, 1999) could not be
replicated when participants concurrently performed an articula-
tory suppression task, thus suggesting that an increase in the
number of to-be-remembered items only leads to a stronger PRP
effect if those items can be articulated during encoding. Further-
more, although Stevanovski and Jolicœur did not include a con-
dition without articulatory suppression, a comparison with a highly
similar experiment by Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1998) suggested
that the magnitude of the PRP effect seems to be attenuated overall
when articulatory suppression is performed.
The idea that verbal coding might lead to a stronger PRP effect
offers an interesting explanation for why the current experiments
did not show a strong PRP effect. To wit, it can be argued that
verbal coding was much less likely to occur in the current exper-
iments than in the experiments that did show a pronounced PRP
effect because the to-be-remembered stimuli were presented for
only 100 ms in the current experiments, whereas they were pre-
sented for 250 ms in the previous experiments (Jolicœur &
Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Tombu et al., 2011). As suggested by
Stevanovski and Jolicœur (2007), verbal coding is more likely to
occur with longer display durations—if only because phonological
codes are not activated instantaneously upon the appearance of a
stimulus (see also Ferrand & Grainger, 1993)—thus offering a
possible explanation for why the current experiments did not show
a strong PRP effect. Indeed, it is also of interest to note that
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a memory task with verbal (i.e.,
letters) and nonverbal stimuli (a complex visual shape—the Kanji
character) led to a comparable PRP effect, suggesting that the use
of a short exposure indeed prevented verbal coding as one would
otherwise expect a stronger PRP effect for the experiment with
letter targets. Taken together, these considerations lead us to
hypothesize that the reason why the current experiments did not
show a strong PRP effect is because the use of a short and masked
exposure precluded the use of verbal coding in memorizing the
target stimuli.
7 In an as yet unpublished series of studies, we found that the retroactive
interference effect also occurs when a to-be-reported sequence of letters—
shown in rapid serial visual presentation—is followed by a 2-AFC task
(Nieuwenstein & Wyble, 2013), which is worth mentioning as it under-
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Figure 5. Results of Experiment 1 of Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1998).
Participants had to memorize one or three letters that were shown for 250
ms and followed by a 100-ms pattern mask. The letters were followed by
a speeded two-alternative pitch discrimination task. A. Proportion of trials
in which all letters were correctly recalled. B. Response times for second
task. SOA  stimulus onset asynchrony. Reprinted from “The Demonstra-
tion of Short-Term Consolidation,” by P. Jolicœur & R. Dell’Acqua, 1998,





































































































1420 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
Studies on the attentional blink. A second set of studies that
present a markedly different pattern of results than that seen in the
current study can be found in studies in which participants were
asked to report two target stimuli (e.g., letters) that were embedded
in a rapid sequence of distractors (e.g., digits). To wit, the typical
pattern of results obtained in these experiments is that performance
on the second target suffers a pronounced attentional blink effect,
whereas performance on the first target is relatively accurate,
unless it is followed within less than about 100 ms by the second
target (see Figure 6; Dux & Marois, 2009; Martens & Wyble,
2010). In accounting for this pattern of results, it is often assumed
that the attentional blink effect for the second target reflects an
interference effect that is caused by the consolidation of the first
target, with one proposal being that the consolidation of the first
target results in an attentional blink because it involves a slow and
immutable processing bottleneck (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995;
Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; Shih, 2008), whereas another pro-
poses that the consolidation of the first target results in an atten-
tional blink because it leads to a momentary lack of attention for
newly encountered stimuli (e.g., Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Wyble
et al., 2009, 2011; see also Taatgen et al., 2009). According to both
accounts, the initial “sparing” effect seen for second-target recall at
an SOA of 100 ms occurs because the selection of information for
consolidation in working memory occurs during an attentional
episode that is initiated upon detection of the first target and that
lasts approximately 100–200 ms, thus allowing a second target to
be selected for consolidation in the slipstream of the first target.
In relating the current findings to those obtained in the atten-
tional blink paradigm, an interesting question is whether the ret-
roactive interference effect seen in the present experiments could
be due to a similar mechanism as the first-target impairment seen
at an SOA of 100 ms in the attentional blink paradigm. The answer
is that this is highly unlikely because the latter first-target impair-
ment is only found in combination with a sparing effect for the
second target, and this combination of results is in turn only found
when the temporal, and featural similarity of the two targets is
high. To be precise, the results of studies on the attentional blink
rarely show a first-target impairment if the two targets are pre-
sented at an SOA of more than 100 ms (e.g., Arnell & Jolicœur,
1999; Nieuwenstein, Potter, & Theeuwes, 2009; Nieuwenstein,
Van der Burg, Theeuwes, Wyble, & Potter, 2009; but see Hommel
& Akyurek, 2005, for an interesting exception), when they are
drawn from different stimulus categories (e.g., Juola, Botella, &
Palacios, 2004), or when they are presented in different modalities
(e.g., Potter, Chun, Banks, & Muckenhoupt, 1998; see also Visser,
Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999). In contrast, the retroactive interference
effect seen in the current experiments occurred across SOAs of up
to 500 ms, it occurred after a mask, and it occurred across different
combinations of modalities, target categories, and tasks. Accord-
ingly, it may be concluded that while the first-target impairment
seen in the attentional blink paradigm reflects a cost that is specific
to tightly circumscribed conditions in which the two targets can be
selected and consolidated in parallel, the retroactive interference
effect found in the current experiments may be better explained in
terms of a disruption of an already initiated consolidation process
for the first target.
A second question that may be asked with regard to studies on
the attentional blink is why these studies do not show a more
pronounced and protracted retroactive interference effect such as
that observed in the current experiments. There are two reasons
why this effect may rarely be found in the attentional blink
paradigm. The first derives from the current finding that the
magnitude of retroactive interference was markedly attenuated
when the consolidation load for the memory task was reduced
from four to two letters. Since the targets used in the attentional
blink paradigm typically each comprise only a single familiar
stimulus such as a letter or a digit, it stands to reason that the
consolidation load imposed by such a first target may simply be
too low to render its consolidation vulnerable to interference from
a trailing target. Furthermore, it also stands to reason that the
second target in the attentional blink paradigm—which typically
comprises a single letter or a digit that is embedded among
distractor stimuli—is much less likely to “breakthrough” the at-
tentional blink and perturb the ongoing consolidation of an earlier
target than an unmasked target that appears abruptly on a blank
screen and that requires a rapid decision and response. Indeed, it is
of interest note that the only study on the attentional blink that
found a strong and protracted retroactive interference effect in-
volved a study in which the consolidation load was high (i.e.,
participants had to recall a string of five digits or letters in the
correct order) and in which the second target was highly salient
(i.e., the second target also comprised a string of five characters,
but it depicted the same letter or digit five times in a row, for
example: “EEEEE”; Ouimet & Jolicœur, 2007). Accordingly, it
may be concluded that the reason why studies on the attentional
blink typically show little evidence for retroactive interference
beyond an SOA of 100 ms lies in the combination of a relatively
low consolidation load for the first target and the use of a weak and
relatively unobtrusive second target.
Studies showing interference during memory retention. A
last set of findings that is of interest to the interpretation of the
current findings stems from studies that examined the extent to
which information retained in working memory may be vulnerable

























Figure 6. Archetypal pattern of results for recall of the first (T1) and
second target (T2) in the attentional blink paradigm, with performance for
T2 shown only for trials on which recall of T1 was correct (T2|T1). The lag
variable on the x-axis denotes the temporal position of T2 in steps of 100
ms. Reprinted from “The Attentional Blink: Past, Present, and Future of a
Blind Spot in Perceptual Awareness,” by S. Martens and B. Wyble, 2010,







































































































several studies that show that the execution of a second task can
interfere with memory for one or more stimuli that were presented
several seconds earlier (Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007; Ricker &
Cowan, 2010; see also Ueno, Allen, Baddeley, Hitch, & Saito,
2011), and there have also been several studies that found that a
distractor can interfere with retention of a similar stimulus shown
1–5 s earlier (e.g., Magnussen & Greenlee, 1999; Magnussen,
Greenlee, Asplund, Dyrnes, 1991; Vuontela, Rämä, Raninen,
Aronen, & Carlson, 1999).
An interesting and important difference between these findings
and those of current experiments, however, is that the interference
effects follow a markedly different time course. This is perhaps
most clearly illustrated by comparing the results of Experiments 1,
3, and 4 of the current study to those reported by Ricker and
Cowan (2010; see Figure 7). In the study by Ricker and Cowan
participants performed a speeded auditory parity judgment task for
a target that was presented 1.5–6.0 s after the appearance of a
to-be-remembered array of letters. As can be seen in Figure 7, the
presence of the parity judgment task interfered with memory, but
this interference effect increased as SOA increased from 1.5 to 6 s.
In contrast, the retroactive interference effect observed in the
current experiments decreased as SOA increased from 250–1,000
ms. Thus, whereas the results of Ricker and Cowan suggest that
information retained in working memory becomes increasingly
more vulnerable to interference across a seconds-long retention
interval, the current findings show that a memory trace initially
becomes increasingly less vulnerable to interference as the period
of time available for WMC increases from 250–1,000 ms. By
implication, the retroactive interference effects seen in the current
study cannot be explained by assuming that the consolidation of
the stimuli was already completed before the 2-AFC task and that
the interference arose during the retention—as opposed to the
consolidation—of information in working memory.
Synthesis and conclusions. In summary, it can be concluded
that the current experiments are the first to demonstrate that the
process of consolidating visual information into working memory
can be disrupted by a trailing task. As is indicated by the results
from studies on the attentional blink, a stimulus that has been
selected for consolidation is no longer as easily disturbed as it is
during the first 100 ms of processing, but the current findings make
clear that such a disturbance does occur when consolidation load is
high, and when the second task involves an unmasked target for a
speeded discrimination task. Thus, the current findings not only
present a compelling argument against the idea that the consoli-
dation of a visual stimulus is interrupted by a mask, but they also
present an important novel challenge to theories of dual-task
interference that have taken the results from previous studies to
suggest that WMC involves an immutable information processing
bottleneck (e.g., Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998, 1999; Marois &
Ivanoff, 2005; Tombu et al., 2011; Zylberberg et al., 2010, 2011).
A Possible Account of the Current Findings
Last, we consider a possible account of how WMC operates,
how it might continue after a mask and how it might be disturbed
by a trailing 2-AFC task, especially when the amount of to-be-
consolidated information is relatively high. In addressing these
matters, we use the episodic simultaneous type—serial token (eSTST)
model proposed by Wyble and colleagues as our starting point
(Wyble et al., 2009; see also Bowman & Wyble, 2007). This
model is a neural network implementation of a theory of attention
and WMC, which has been shown to be capable of simulating both
behavioral and electrophysiological indices of attentional selection
and memory consolidation in the attentional blink, and a number of
related phenomena (e.g., Craston, Wyble, Chennu, & Bowman,
2009; Dell’Acqua, Wyble, Dux, & Jolicœur, 2012; Lagroix et al.,
2012; Spalek, Lagroix, Yanko, & Di Lollo, 2012; Wyble et al.,
2011). Furthermore, in comparison to other accounts of the role of
WMC in dual-task interference (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995; De-
haene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998;
Shih, 2008; Taatgen et al., 2009; see also Zylberberg et al., 2010),
the eSTST account appears especially well suited to explain the
current findings because it is the only account that does not assume
that WMC involves an immutable serial processing bottleneck, and
it also offers a mechanism that can explain how consolidation may
be disturbed by a trailing target. In the following sections, we first
present the architecture and assumptions of the model, and then
turn to the insights the model offers for explaining the current
findings.
Architecture and assumptions of the eSTST model. In ac-
cordance with most accounts of visual information processing, the
eSTST model distinguishes between sensory processing mecha-
nisms that operate rapidly in representing visual stimuli (the first
stage, labeled as “input” in Figure 8), a mechanism of WMC that
operates more slowly (the second stage, labeled as “encoding” in
Figure 8), and an attentional enhancement mechanism that can
























Figure 7. Retroactive interference during the retention phase of a work-
ing memory task. Recognition performance for an array of letters is shown
as a function of the duration of the retention interval for the memory task.
In the “Parity” condition, the retention interval was followed by the target
for an auditory parity judgment task. In the No Load condition, there was
no second task. Error bars show SE. Adapted from “Loss of Visual
Working Memory Within Seconds: The Combined Use of Refreshable and
Non-Refreshable Features,” by T. J. Ricker and N. Cowan, 2010, Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36, p.





































































































1422 NIEUWENSTEIN AND WYBLE
these two stages of processing (the so-called blaster, labeled as
“transient attention” in Figure 8).
Stage 1: Activation of types and modulation by attention.
The workings of the model are such that when a to-be-remembered
stimulus is presented, this triggers a cascade of activation from the
input layer into the type layer, mirroring the rapid feedforward
activation of high-level representations along the ventral visual
pathway (e.g., Keysers et al., 2001; Logothetis & Sheinberg,
1996). Transfer of activation along this feedforward pathway can
be enhanced by a transient attention mechanism that produces a
temporary enhancement of visual processing upon detection of a
(potentially) task-relevant stimulus (see also Chun & Potter, 1995;
Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989; Olivers & Meeter, 2008), and such
enhancement plays an important role in the encoding of a masked
visual stimulus. To wit, according to the eSTST model, consoli-
dation is initiated only once the activation of a type node reaches
a threshold of activation, and the effect of a mask is to curtail the
accumulation of this activation (cf. Kovács et al., 1995; Rolls et al.,
1999; see also Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000). Hence, the initiation
of encoding for a masked stimulus depends on the extent to which
its representation can be strengthened by attentional enhancement
(see also Dehaene et al., 2006; Shih, 2008).
Stage 2: Encoding by binding types to tokens. Once a type
node reaches the threshold of activation, encoding is initiated. The
encoding process is implemented as a binding process wherein a
link is established between a type and a token. Similar to the
item-position units assumed in models of serial recall tasks (e.g.,
Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher,
2005; Oberauer et al., 2012), and similar to prefrontal cortex
neurons that are found to show sustained stimulus-selective re-
sponses during working memory maintenance (e.g., Fuster &
Alexander, 1971; Miller et al., 1996), the tokens in eSTST can be
considered as episodic markers that are capable of sustaining their
activation over time and that can store information about a per-
ceived stimulus by means of being linked to the type nodes that
represent that stimulus. The establishment of such a link occurs by
means of recurrent interactions within an intermediate binding
pool, which includes nodes that can be activated by types and that
can in turn activate a token. During this binding process, the
activation of a type is sustained by means of recurrent activations
until a token enters a self-sustaining state that supports the reten-
tion and retrieval of the associated type at a later point in time.
Parallel encoding of multiple types. In simulating the encod-
ing of several items, as would be required for the current experi-
ments involving a display of two or four letters, the eSTST model
assumes that those letters that produce sufficient activation in the
corresponding type nodes are admitted to the consolidation stage,
thus resulting in the parallel consolidation of these letters. In this
regard, the model differs from most other accounts of WMC,
which typically assume that consolidation involves a slow and
serial process (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995; Dehaene et al., 2003;
Shih, 2008; Taatgen et al., 2009; see also Zylberberg et al., 2010).
Importantly, however, this is not to say that eSTST assumes no
limit to the consolidation of information in working memory.
Rather, the model includes two mechanisms that limit the encoding
of visual information in working memory. The first is that the
consolidation of a stimulus is assumed to result in a suppression of
attention for newly perceived stimuli, thus resulting in an atten-
tional blink in case such a stimulus is shown briefly and followed
by a mask. A second limitation arises due to interference between
co-active types. As a result of this interference, the activation that
feeds the type-token binding process will be weakened when
multiple items are being consolidated into WM in parallel, thus
resulting in a less efficient consolidation process (see also
Dell’Acqua et al., 2012; Wyble et al., 2011).
Explaining the current findings: Insights from the eSTST
model. In proposing that WMC occurs by means of a recurrent
process wherein types are linked to tokens, the eSTST model
offers a straightforward explanation for how consolidation could
continue after a stimulus is masked. To wit, if a stimulus is
masked, the appearance of a mask may indeed interrupt the feed-
forward activation of the type nodes that represent the stimulus,
but the activation of these type nodes can be sustained through the
recurrent interactions that mediate the binding to a token. In other
words, the model assumes that consolidation can continue after a
mask, because the binding process that mediates consolidation
sustains the activation of the corresponding type until its consol-
idation is completed (see also Shih, 2008; Taatgen et al., 2009;
Zylberberg et al., 2010). Furthermore, the model also suggests a
reason why consolidation may become especially prone to retro-
active interference when the amount of to-be-consolidated infor-
mation is high. Specifically, in assuming that consolidation can
occur for multiple types in parallel, though at the expense of
mutual interference between co-active types, the model effectively
proposes that the representation of a to-be-encoded stimulus will
be weakened when it is encoded in parallel with other stimuli. As
a result, the consolidation of a stimulus would be expected to
become increasingly vulnerable to interference as the number of
to-be-consolidated stimuli increases. Last, the model also offers
insight into why the current studies yielded evidence for retroac-
tive, whereas this effect has thus far not been found in so many
previous studies on the attentional blink. To wit, since the model
Figure 8. The eSTST model of attention and working memory consoli-
dation. The model includes an input layer that provides the input to a
mechanism of attentional enhancement, called the blaster, and a mecha-
nism of working memory consolidation, denoted as encoding. For the input
layer, “T” denotes target, that is, a to-be-remembered stimulus, whereas
“D” denotes distractor. Adapted from “The Attentional Blink Provides
Episodic Distinctiveness: Sparing at a Cost,” by B. Wyble, H. Bowman, &
M. R. Nieuwenstein, 2009, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human







































































































assumes that the consolidation of a first stimulus leads to an
attentional blink by means of causing a momentary suppression of
attention for newly encountered stimuli, a first requirement for any
type of retroactive interference with the consolidation of a first
target would be that the second target “breaks through” this atten-
tional blink effect. In the current experiments, such a breakthrough
effect could occur because, unlike the second target in an atten-
tional blink task, the second target in our experiments was neither
embedded among distractors nor followed by a mask. As a result,
the second target’s representation could achieve sufficient strength
to allow it to be processed despite the suppression of attention, thus
resulting in interference with the ongoing consolidation of the
earlier shown stimuli.
What remains to be explained then is how a 2-AFC task may
perturb the ongoing consolidation of an earlier shown stimulus.
While the mechanisms of attention and WMC proposed by eSTST
offer important guidance for understanding how consolidation can
continue after a mask, and why it may be vulnerable to interference
from a trailing task, the model in its current form does not directly
offer an account for the retroactive interference effect as found in
the current experiments. In considering how such interference
might arise, we can nevertheless conceive of two possibilities (cf.
Tombu & Jolicœur, 2005). The first adheres to the notion of a
central bottleneck and proposes that since WMC and response
selection cannot be performed in parallel, it must be the case that
the response selection task interrupted the ongoing consolidation
of the earlier stimuli. An interesting perspective on why these two
tasks cannot be performed in parallel can be found in recent
modeling work by Zylberberg et al. (2010), who proposed a
neural-network model of the PRP effect that was also found to be
capable of simulating performance in a memory-consolidation
task. An important assumption of this model is that it proposes that
response selection and WMC both rely on the same neural net-
work, which imposes a serial processing bottleneck because its
configuration can only support one of these two tasks at a time.
Thus, according to this account, the current finding of a retroactive
interference effect could be explained in terms of a process-
interruption or task-switching effect, the idea being that the ap-
pearance of the target for the 2-AFC task would trigger the
reconfiguration of the processing network, thus effectively causing
the ongoing consolidation process to be aborted. While intuitively
appealing, it is important to note that this account has difficulty in
explaining why a color discrimination task produces a much stron-
ger retroactive interference effect than a color detection task, as
both these tasks would seem to require a reconfiguration of the
processing network. Furthermore, it is also unclear how this ac-
count could accommodate the findings by Ouimet and Jolicœur
(2007), who showed that an unspeeded target identification task
can also produce retroactive interference with the consolidation of
an earlier stimulus. Evidently, if the retroactive interference were
due to the requirement to switch between two different types of
tasks, one would not expect this effect to occur when the two tasks
each require the same type of processing.
An alternative account that does offer an explanation for these
results adheres more closely to the eSTST model and proposes that
the retroactive interference effect may be a consequence of inter-
ference between the type representations that are activated by
processing the targets for the two tasks (Wyble et al., 2009, 2011;
see also Bowman & Wyble, 2007). Specifically, it could be argued
that a 2-AFC task also involves the activation of a type, such that
the activation of a type would drive the accumulation of evidence
in a drift diffusion process that eventually results in the selection
and activation of a response that is associated with that type (e.g.,
Ratcliff & Rouder, 2000). From such an extension of the eSTST
model, it follows that the retroactive interference effect could arise
as a consequence of interference among co-active types, the idea
being that the strong activation of the type for the highly salient
2-AFC target would lower the activation of the types for the
preceding items that are already in the consolidation pipeline, thus
resulting in a loss of some of this information. In comparison to the
process-interruption account, this account has the benefit that it
can more easily explain why a color discrimination task produces
a stronger retroactive interference effect than a color detection
task, as the duration of type-activation would be longer in a
discrimination task, and this would increase the amount of inter-
ference within the type layer. Furthermore, this account also nat-
urally explains why an unspeeded identification task could also
produce retroactive interference (Ouimet & Jolicouer, 2007), as
the second target for this task would also be expected to produce
interference within the type layer.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the current study is the first to show that the
consolidation of a visual stimulus can be disturbed for several
hundred milliseconds after a mask by a trailing 2-AFC task. This
finding provides compelling evidence that WMC is not terminated
when a visual stimulus is backward masked, and it provides
compelling evidence against the long-standing view that consoli-
dation involves an immutable processing bottleneck. Aside from
these important conclusions, this finding raises many interesting
new questions for research, as it remains to be determined how the
retroactive interference effect can best be explained, and how it
relates to other phenomena in research on working memory and
dual-task performance.
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